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Videotape in Criminal Proceedings
By JAMES P. BARBER* and PHILIP R. BATES* *
A California jury recently viewed the testimony of an eyewitness
to a murder. Making this event unique was the fact that the witness
was deceased and his testimony was presented on videotape.' While
this by-product of the communications field has become well-known
to the public, it only recently found its way into the legal process as
an evidentiary tool both in civil and criminal trials.
A trial generally can be defined as an adversary proceeding con-
ducted in such a fashion that the truth may be ascertained and the
proceedings justly determined. Any technological device used in the
courtroom is subordinated to, and used in support of, this fact-finding
process. Videotape, if it is to be of any value to the legal community,
necessarily must be used only as an aid in the trial process. Video-
tape is an extremely effective device for recording and transcribing
events, as the broadcasting industry has demonstrated. However, put-
ing the reproduction tool in the hands of a cameraman rather than
a stenographer does not insure that the recorded transcription will occur
unbiased.
Because of the television stigma associated with videotape and
the very real possibility of intentional or inadvertent distortion of re-
corded events, videotape has not attracted as avid a following in the
* A.B., 1967, University of California, Santa Barbara; J.D., 1973, Hastings
College of the Law, University of California; Member, California Bar.
** A.B., 1970, University of California, Los Angeles; J.D., 1973, Hastings Col-
lege of the Law, University of California; Member, California Bar.
1. People v. Moran, Crim. No. 15807 (Super. Ct., Contra Costa County, Cal.,
filed Dec. 27, 1972). The Superior Court order permitting the use of videotape read
in pertinent part: 'The court, after considering the motions of the People and the de-
fendant, makes the following order: . . . . (2) That William Pifer [the deceased wit-
ness] is an unavailable witness as defined in section 240 of the Evidence Code [of
California]. (3) That after personally viewing and hearing the audio-visual tapes, the
court finds that the production is of such quality and the sound is of sufficient clarity
that to use the tapes is entirely proper, and the court directs that the entire tapes shall
be shown without being edited." Id., Court order of Mar. 2, 1973, at 1.
[1017]
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
judiciary as it has elsewhere. Nevertheless, videotape has found sig-
nificant use in the courtroom. Obviously, the more fertile area for ex-
ploration and experimentation with the use of videotape is in civil pro-
ceedings.' Criminal trials present a more difficult setting because of
the more strict constitutional and evidentiary standards involved.
Surprisingly, a number of courts have rendered decisions on the
use of videotape in criminal trials and have set a course of judicial
thinking which is both wise and logical. 3  Generally, the courts reason
that videotape is a combination of tape recordings and motion pictures,
both of which have already found recognition and acceptance in crimi-
nal trials. As such, videotape should be subject to no more restrictive
scrutiny than its predecessors. Consequently, the case law has been
favorable to the use of videotape in criminal proceedings and has
shown that the issues involved deal more with evidentiary problems
than constitutional issues. In spite of the embryonic state of the art,
there are surprisingly few legal impediments to the use of videotape
in courtrooms. The following sections analyze some of the issues in-
volved, with particular emphasis on California and federal law.
2. See generally, Brennan, Videotape-The Michigan Experience, 24 HASTINGS
L.J. 1 (1972); Kennelly, The Practical Uses of Trialvision and Depovision, 16 TRIAL
LAWYERS GUIDE 183 (1972); Kornblum, Videotape in Civil Cases, 24 HASTINGS L.J.
9 (1972); McCrystal, Ohio's First Video Tape Trial, 45 OHIO BAR 1 (1972); Merlo
& Sorenson, Video Tape: The Coming Courtroom Tool, 7 TRIAL, Nov./Dec. 1971, at
55; Morrill, Enter-The Video Tape Trial, 3 JOHN MARSH. J. PRAC. & PROC. 237
(1970); Murray, Comments on Videotape Trial-from Counsel for the Plaintiff, Mc-
Call v. Clemens, 45 OHIO BAR 25 (1972); Paradis, The Celluloid Witness, 37 U. COLO.
L. REv. 235 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Paradis]; Sullivan, Court Record by Video-
Tape Experiment-A Success, 50 Cm. B. REc. 336 (1969); Watts, Comments on a
Video Tape Trial-from Counsel for the Defense, McCall v. Clemens, 45 OHIo BAR
51 (1972); Comment, Judicial Administration-Technological Advances-Use of Vid-
eotape in the Courtroom and the Stationhouse, 20 DE PAUL L. REv. 924 (1971) [here-
inafter cited as DE PAUL Comment]; Comment, Video Tape: Its Admissibility in Evi-
dence and Other Uses, 5 GA. S.B.J. 393 (1969); Comment, Videotape: A New Hori-
zon in Evidence, 4 JOHN MARSH. J. PRAc. & PROC. 339 (1971); 38 Mo. L. REv. 111
(1973).
3. In an address to the Pennsylvania Bar Association on June 26, 1971, Federal
District Court Judge Joseph F. Weis, Jr., stated: "I presided over three trials in which
videotape depositions were used. In each instance the witness was a physician who
could not be available for the trial, two of them being from out of town.
"A videotape presentation is far superior to the customary deposition which is read
to a jury. The difference between the two indeed is startling.
"During November, last year, a case was tried before me where the depositions
of two New York doctors were read. Because the jury could not agree on a verdict,
there was a retrial in January and this time videotape depositions of these two physi-
cians were used instead of the routine type.
"Since I had an opportunity to see the same testimony presented in two different
ways, it was easy to make a comparison. The effect of seeing the witnesses, making
1018 [Vol. 25
Pretrial Use
To date, criminal videotape cases have involved the use of videotape
principally in a pretrial setting. Courts, hearing cases involving the tap-
ing of confessions, 4 lineups,5 scenes of the crime0 and police actions,7
have had little trouble upholding the use of videotape in spite of the ob-
vious opportunity for prejudicially altering the finished product. When
put in proper perspeotive these decisions are not as radical as they may
seem. The law involving videotape is merely a part of the evolving
law of evidence regarding the use of mechanical recording devices.
Motion pictures were introduced into the courtroom shortly after the
judgments of their credibility and accuracy depending on tone of voice, hesitancy in
answering, facial expressions, and general appearance cannot be overestimated.
"The bar as a whole has not responded as eagerly as I had hoped. The attor-
neys who have used videotape are most enthusiastic about it but there is a reluctance
on the part of many to try this new device.
"As of this time, I have noticed no general tendency to substitute videotape medi-
cal testimony for that of the live witness.
"From the standpoint of the doctor, of course, the advantages in scheduling the
deposition at a time when it would not conflict with his surgical or office schedule
is obvious.
"In one of the cases, a physician from Columbus, Ohio came to Pittsburgh on
a Sunday morning, completed the videotape deposition, and returned to his home im-
mediately afterwards. He was quite pleased with this manner of handling his testi-
mony which did not require him to interrupt a busy schedule during the week follow-
ing.
"After my experience with audio visual presentations and sitting through a number
of Jackson vs. Denno type hearings which as you know are concerned with the volun-
tariness of confessions in criminal trials, I find it hard to justify the taking of a confes-
sion by a police department in its headquarters by any means other than videotape.
It is so much superior to the painfully typed question and answer statement and reveals
so much of demeanor, hesitancy or spontaneity that many of the hearings on voluntari-
ness could be eliminated or drastically shortened."
California Superior Court Judge Raymond R. Roberts, in a speech before the San
Fernando Valley Bar Association, reported on the rise in the use of videotape in the
field of law both in and out of the courtroom. The Los Angeles County Sheriff's De-
partment is now using a videotaping van for taking confessions, analyzing testing prac-
tices used by experts to aid in their cross-examination, supervising drunk driving tests,
preserving testimony of immature witnesses, and recording search and seizure evidence.
Los Angeles Daily Journal, Dec. 4, 1973, at 19.
4. Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972); State v. Hendricks,
456 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1970) (same case); Paramore v. State, 229 S.W.2d 855 (Fla.
1969); State v. Lusk, 452 S.W.2d 219 (Mo. 1970) (dictum).
5. State v. Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473 (1971).
6. People v. Mines, 132 Ill. App. 2d 628, 270 N.E.2d 265 (1971).
7. State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1972).
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turn of the century. 8  Since then, motion pictures have gained wide
acceptance in the legal community and are generally admissible into
evidence under proper circumstances.9 Sound recordings entered the
legal picture later, but have nevertheless reached a point where they
have received wide acceptance.' 0 However, the standards of admis-
sibility for sound recordings are more stringent than those for motion
pictures because of the greater possibility of tampering."
A few cases have noted that videotape is merely a combination of
motion pictures and sound recordings.' 2 It is logical that the case law
regarding videotape should build upon the prior law regarding these
other two media. Some attention has been given to the differences
among the three methods, but the courts have generally glossed over
these distinctions. Nonetheless, it should not be troublesome that the
courts pay little or no attention to these technical distinctions. Al-
though some technical differences do exist,' 3 certain aspects of video-
taping have even been recognized as giving more accurate results than
motion pictures. The test is reliability. As long as the traditional
constitutional and evidentiary standards of admissibility are met, there
is nothing inherent in the nature of videotape recordings that would
compel their exclusion in judicial proceedings.
Confessions
To stop here, however, is to ignore some of the legal problems
that the use of videotape does create. Some of these problems mani-
fest themselves when a confession is videotaped and subsequently
played for a jury at trial. There are two aspects to the Fifth Amend-
8. According to one commentator, the year was 1915 and the case was Glyn
v. Western Feature Film Co. Ltd., 114 L.T.R. (n.s.) 354 (1915). Paradis, supra note
2, at 235 & n.1.
9. See generally Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 686 (1958). See also Hutchins v. Florida,
286 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1973), in which it was stated: "Where not otherwise prejudicial,
the use of sound moving pictures, as a scientific advance in presentation of evidentiary
matter at trials, has generally been viewed with approval." Id. at 246.
10. See generally Annot., 58 A.L.R.2d 1024 (1958).
11. A proper foundation is laid for sound recordings if it is shown that (1) the
recording device was capable of taking testimony, (2) the operator was competent, (3)
the recording was authentic and correct, (4) no alterations had been made, (5) the
recording was properly preserved, (6) the speakers are identified and (7) the testimony
was given voluntarily. Id. at 1027-28. In contrast, motion pictures need only satisfy
item (3) above. See C. MCCORMICK, LAW OF EVIDENCE 533-34 & n.71 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as McCoRMICK].
12. State v. Lusk, 452 S.W.2d 219, 224 (Mo. 1970). See also Hendricks v.
Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 505-06 (8th Cir. 1972).
13. DE PAUL Comment, supra note 2, at 928-30; 38 Mo. L. REV. 111 (1973).
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ment's privilege against self-incrimination: the policies underlying the
scope of its coverage and the more pragmatic consideration of the kind
of information that is barred by the amendment.
The Fifth Amendment states that "[n]o person shall be
compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself
.. . .-1The source of this right is found in sixteenth century Eng-
lish law, where the maxim nemo tenctur prodere, or accusareseipsum
(no man is bound to accuse himself) was propounded as a protest
against inquisitorial methods15 which apparently were used to suppress
certain political and religious beliefs. 6 Its original purpose was
merely to require a proper accusation before the individual could be
compelled to answer questions. The concept quickly developed into
the privilege as we know it today under an accusatorial system: in
any proceeding an individual may refuse to answer any question where
the answer thereto might be used or might uncover further evidence
against him.'
The United States Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Ari-
zona,1 prohibiting the use of statements against an accused before
his rights have been read to him, has rekindled a discussion of the
policies underlying the privilege. The concern over the scope of the
privilege is not new and, as in the past, it has commanded the atten-
tion of great legal minds. Mr. Justice Goldberg concisely and compre-
hensively summarized the traditional rationales of the privilege in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission.2" They are (1) an unwillingness
to subject suspects to the cruel dilemma of self-accusation, perjury or
contempt, (2) a preference for an accusatorial rather than an inquisi-
torial system of criminal justice, (3) a fear of eliciting self-incrimi-
nating statements by inhumane means, (4) a sense of fair play which
dictates leaving the individual alone until there is good cause to disturb
14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
15. LEGISLATIVE REFERENCE SERVICE, Thn CoNsmOrroN OF THE UNrTED STATES
OF AMERICA, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 953 (1964) [hereinafter cited as LRS
ANALYSIS OF CONSTITUTION].
16. Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CN. L REv. 671, 678 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Fifth Amendment
Tomorrow]. See also Thompson, Judge Friendly's Amendment to the Fifth Amend-
ment: A Comment on a Recent Criticism of the Supreme Court, 38 U. CIN. L. REV.
488 (1969). See generally E. GRISWOLD, The Fifth Amendment Today (1955); L.
IEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT, THE RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION
(1968).
17. LRS ANALYSIS OF CONSTrTrunoN, supra note 15, at 953.
18. Id.
19. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
20. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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him and which requires the prosecution to shoulder the entire load,
(5) a respect for the human personality and the right to a private
enclave in which to lead a private life, (6) a distrust of self-depreca-
tory statements and (7) a realization that a shelter for the guilty may
also protect the innocent.2 '
Since Murphy, changes in the membership of the Court and criti-
cism from esteemed members of the legal community22 have made
it difficult to chart with any accuracy the direction the Court will take
in future decisions. Former California Chief Justice Traynor was criti-
cal of Fifth Amendment interpretations even before the Miranda
decision. 23  He has advocated that the courts giving interpretations to the
privilege should seek a middle ground which would afford protection
to the individual against the state without simultaneously thwarting ef-
forts of the state to prosecute crime effectively.2' One proposal made
by Justice Traynor to help reach this middle ground was to require
21. Id. at 55.
22. In a recent article, Judge Friendly has been critical of the lack of any discus-
sion of the pros and cons in the Supreme Court's decisions concerning the privilege.
Fifth Amendment Tomorrow, supra note 16. He points out that the privilege is some-
what of an anomaly in the battery of privileges generated by our courts. Other privi-
leges, for example, those which protect communications between husband and wife, at-
torney and client, doctor and patient, preserve and protect relationships possessing so-
cial value. While these privileges have failed to receive broad interpretation, the privi-
lege against self-incrimination, which involves the relationship between the state and
the accused, has received an expanded interpretation. The great difference in result
(i.e., greater protection for those suspected of crime) is not completely explained by
the differences in the relationships involved. Id. at 680, n.48. Moreover, while the
other privileges conform with our notions of decent conduct, the privilege against self-
incrimination runs against social mores which impose a duty to answer with the truth,
to respond to questions and to get an incident off of one's chest. Id. at 680. The
privilege also may impede the search for the truth by preventing interrogation of the
guilty by the unjustly accused. Id. at 680-81. There are other inconsistencies that
surface upon an objective investigation of this rule of law. For instance, Professor
Mayers suggests that it is far more cruel to require a mother to testify against her
son than it would be to compel him to testify against himself. L. MAYERS, SHALL WE
AMEND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT? 168-69 (1959). Yet that is the state of our law.
Judge Friendly has subsequently commented that he would now "not at all regret hav-
ing [his] proposal for constitutional amendment placed on the back burner until we
see what the Burger Court will do." Friendly, Time and Tide in the Supreme Court,
2 CONN. L. REV. 213, 220 (1969). In this article Judge Friendly noted that the Court
has the means available for changing course without being false to the spirit or letter
of the privilege. Id. at 219. See also Comment, Chief Justice Burger: Whither Now
the Supreme Court?, 15 S.D.L. REV. 41 (1970).
23. See, e.g., People v. Modesto, 62 Cal. 2d 436, 398 P.2d 753, 42 Cal. Rptr.
417 (1965); Traynor, The Devils of Due Process in Criminal Detection, Detention
and Trial, 33 U. CHi. L. REV. 657 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Devils of Due Process].
24. Devils of Due Process, supra note 23, at 675.
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police to make either "tape or stenographic recordings of interroga-
tions."2 5 Indeed, the videotaping of such interrogations would present
courts with more accurate and complete records of the circumstances
under which confessions are made and would assist the bench in its
decision making process.
There exists a second plane on which the privilege has received
attention, regarding which there is far less controversy. The issues
involved at this level of discussion stem from the United States Su-
preme Court's decisions in Schmerber v. California" and United States
v. Wade.17  These decisions make a distinction between "communica-
tions" and "testimony" on the one hand and "real or physical evi-
dence' on the other; the Fifth Amendment bar generally applies to
the former but not the latter.28 The term "testimony" includes that
extracted by compulsion from the accused's mouth.29  "Real evi-
dence," on the other hand, includes such evidence as fingerprints,
photographs, measurements, voice and handwriting exemplars and ap-
pearances in court which might include standing, assuming a stance,
walking, gesturing or other similar actions.30
Mere appearance in court has never been considered testimony
in the constitutional sense3' and, therefore, photographs of individuals
for identification purposes are not barred by the Fifth Amendment
because they portray-and can only portray-an individual's looks.
Sound motion picture and videotape recordings are subject to the same
evidentiary standards as photographs because of the similarity of the
media.32 However, such recordings take on constitutional proportions
when they portray confessions, considered testimony in the most tradi-
tional sense, and therefore subject to the Fifth Amendment privilege.
The courts have acknowledged both aspects of recorded confessions
by requiring that a double foundation must be laid before they are
admitted into evidence. Initially, it must be shown that the statements
25. ld. at 678.
26. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
27. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
28. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 764. The Court noted that this was
not a hard and fast rule. However, it has been so applied. See City of Piqua v.
Hinger, 15 Ohio St. 2d 110, 238 N.E.2d 766 (1968).
29. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. at 762-63.
30. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 2265 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
31. Photographs are dubbed demonstrative evidence because they are tangible
items capable of inspection by direct use of the senses. However, they are normally
identified and authenticated by testimonial evidence. McCoRMNcK, supra note 11, at
528-31.
32. See, e.g., Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 505-06 (8th Cir. 1972).
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were made freely and voluntarily without compulsion or inducement
of any sort.3" This insures that any testimony given will not be used
against an accused without an intelligent waiver of the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege. Secondly, the recording must be shown to be an ac-
curate reproduction of the events that occurred.8 4  Two early cases,
Commonwealth v. Roller35 and People v. Hayes,"6 together forming
the cornerstone upon which other case law has been built, allowed
sound motion pictures of confessions by suspects charged with larceny
and manslaughter, respectively. Both courts reasoned that movies
were no longer a novelty and that the judiciary had a duty to avail
itself of aid from modern technology in its search for the truth.
Analogous reasoning is applicable to confessions recorded on vid-
eotape, as illustrated by the Supreme Court of Florida in Paramore
v. State.3 7 The defendant in that case was charged with first degree
murder. He had been given the Miranda warnings and the entire
interview was recorded on videotape. Against assertions that he was
falsely induced to testify and that no continuity of possession of the
tape was shown, the court, citing Hayes, upheld the admissibility of
the videotaped confession.
More recently, Paramore was followed in Hendricks v. Swenson.3 s
Again, the charge was first degree murder. After exhausting his state
remedies, 9 the defendant appealed to the Eighth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals from a denial of his writ of habeas corpus by the district court.
In a two-to-one decision, the court of appeals affirmed denial of the
writ and rendered an informative opinion on the use of videotape in
criminal proceedings. Brushing aside the dissent's worry regarding
the entertainment stigma associated with videotape and television, the
majority emphasized the different purposes involved, the one to enter-
tain and the other to present evidence. The defendant had been fully
advised of his rights and there was no evidence of coercion. Further-
more, the defendant was made aware of the use, mechanics and effect
of videotape before the taping began. Far from distorting the image
of the defendant as the dissent intimated, videotape was felt by the
majority to be "a modern technique to protect the defendant's rights."
It would show to the jury evidence of physical abuse or strain on the
33. Id. at 504-05.
34. Id. at 506.
35. 100 Pa. Super. 125 (1930).
36. 21 Cal. App. 2d 320, 71 P.2d 321 (1937).
37. 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969).
38. 456 F.2d 503 (8th Cir. 1972).
39. See State v. Hendricks, 456 S.W.2d 11 (Mo. 1970).
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part of the defendant in ways that typewritten statements could not.
In the court's words:
We believe [videotape is] a part of the procedure for obtaining
justice, and emphasize the importance of a trial truly presenting
the facts as they exist. We believe this is best done whether video
tape is used or whether the witnesses testify in court by presenting
the events and parties as they are.
40
The Hendricks court, following in Chief Justice Traynor's path,
felt strongly enough about the use of videotape in the criminal court
to urge that "to the extent possible, all statements of the defendant
should be so preserved . "...41, including the Miranda warnings.
As mentioned earlier, various commentators have been critical of the
Supreme Court's decisions regarding the privilege against self-incrim-
ination.4 - Judge Friendly, of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit, suggested that we might follow Judge Schaefer's proposal to
have the courts supervise prearraignment police interrogations.43
Such suggestions are shrouded by considerations of social policy and
police procedures that are beyond the scope of this brief overview.
From what has been said, however, it is clear that there are no consti-
tutional obstacles to the use of videotaped confessions in criminal pro-
ceedings. Rather than impede the cause of criminal justice, such re-
cordings enhance it by bringing the trier of fact as close as possible to
the event under consideration. The problems are then reduced to
matters of evidentiary consideration, that is, whether the videotape ac-
curately reproduced the interview. A complete and objective portray-
al, including a reading of the Miranda warnings, should reduce the
risk of error in criminal trials that involve confessions. Finally, use
of videotape in the interrogation stage of the proceeding should pro-
vide an empirical body of knowledge on which to base sound policy
decisions.
Other Ex Parte Evidentiary Uses
The case law concerning the use of videotape in criminal pro-
ceedings does not end with confessions. Other cases have followed
the Paranore decision, allowing videotape recordings into evidence in
other essentially ex parte situations. This small body of law has paral-
40. 456 F.2d at 506.
41. Id.
42. See text accompanying notes 23-45 supra.
43. Fifth Amendment Tomorrow, supra note 16, at 713-16. For a discussion of
Judge Friendly's view on the Fifth Amendment bar against self-incrimination, see note
22 supra.
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leled earlier development of the law regarding motion pictures as de-
monstrative evidence in criminal proceedings. The earlier case law ad-
mitted motion pictures into evidence to show the defendants re-enact-
ing the crime, 44 the demeanor of a witness at a Senate hearing 5 or
after an arrest for drunk driving,46 the defendant entering the house
of the person he was alleged to have bribed,47 the defendant's resi-
dence48 or scenes of a bank robbery in progress. 49  One court per-
mitted the prosecution to rerun the film, stop it, reverse it and make
comments about it during closing argument. 50
Courts have allowed introduction of video recordings as demon-
strative evidence of scenes of the crime,5 identification at a lineup
52
and the pursuit of a trail of blood left by the thief. 53  In doing so,
they have ruled that the videotape operator need not have any special
training or skill,54 that no continuity of possession need be shown 5
and that the authenticity and accuracy of the portrayal could be done
by a witness other than the operator. 56 The evidentiary standard of
admissibility, once again, is that the videotape recording be a true and
accurate reproduction of the events it purports to represent.51 Like
other forms of evidence, videotapes may be admitted for limited pur-
poses, and the presence of hearsay in the recording does not preclude
its admission so long as the jury is properly instructed to disregard
the objectionable material.5 8
44. E.g., People v. Dabb, 32 Cal. 2d 491, 197 P.2d 1 (1948); Grant v. State,
171 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1965); cert. denied, 384 U.S. 1014 (1966).
45. United States v. Moran, 194 F.2d 623 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 965
(1952).
46. E.g., Lanford v. People, 159 Colo. 36, 409 P.2d 829 (1966); State v. Strick-
land, 276 N.C. 253, 173 S.E.2d 129 (1970) (reversed for failure of court to conduct
voir dire on the question of whether the taped statements were voluntarily and under-
standingly made); City of Piqua v. Hinger, 15 Ohio St. 2d 110, 238 N.E.2d 766
(1968); Housewright v. State, 154 Tex. Crim. 101, 225 S.W.2d 417 (1949).
47. Jones v. State, 151 Tex. Crim. 519, 209 S.W.2d 613 (1948).
48. State v. O'Brien, 255 La. 704, 232 So. 2d 484 (1970).
49. Mikus v. United States, 433 F.2d 719 (2d Cir. 1970); accord, Williams v.
State, 461 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970).
50. State v. Orzen, 83 N.M. 458, 493 P.2d 768 (Ct. App. 1972).
51. People v. Mines, 132 IlL App. 2d 628, 270 N.E.2d 265 (1971).
52. State v. Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 484 P.2d 473 (1971).
53. State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 498 P.2d 697 (Ct. App. 1972).
54. People v. Mines, 132 Ill. App. 2d 628, 631, 270 N.E.2d 265, 267 (1971).
55. Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969).
56. State v. Thurman, 84 N.M. 5, 8, 498 P.2d 697, 699 (Ct. App. 1972).
57. Id. at 7-8, 498 P.2d at 699-700.
58. Id. at 9, 498 P.2d at 700.
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Videotaping Perfunctory Witnesses
These illustrations by no means exhaust the possible uses of vid-
eotape in the criminal process. There are many aspects of the crim-
inal process that particularly lend themselves to the use of videotape
techniques. The entire California criminal discovery process is essen-
tially a creature of the courts.59 Consequently, the bench will con-
tinue to be instrumental in shaping the course and scope of discovery
in criminal cases.60 While depositions have not played a significant
role in the development of criminal cases, ex parte statements have
inherent value not only for developing and analyzing strengths and
weaknesses of a case but also for possible future impeachment value.6 1
Before an accused can be held over for trial in a prosecution by
information, there must be a preliminary hearing to determine whether
there exists reasonable or probable cause in the belief of the guilt
of the accused. 62 The preliminary hearing is an adversary proceeding
where there is a right to counsel 63 and a right to use evidence obtained
therein at trial.6 However, many of the witnesses at this hearing per-
form merely perfunctory functions, for example, identification of evi-
dence, establishment of a chain of custody for certain evidence and veri-
fication of administrative records such as police blotter reports. Often,
testimony concerning these matters goes unchallenged by the defend-
ant. Where there is no prejudice to the defendant, there is no reason
why such testimony cannot be videotaped prior to the preliminary
hearing with only counsel present for later use at the hearing. Any
objectionable testimony can be taken subject to any objections which
might be made at the actual hearing.
Testimony of this nature is taken with a view to its use at a
courtroom proceeding. It would therefore be subject to rules of
evidence and courtroom procedure. Gathering the necessary wit-
nesses for the preliminary hearing may be a task of major proportions.
Allowing the testimony of perfunctory witnesses to be prerecorded on
59. B. WrixiN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 271 (1963).
60. See generally Nakell, Criminal Discovery for the Defense and the Prosecu-
tion-The Developing Constitutional Considerations, 50 N.C.L. REv. 437 (1972).
61. See, e.g., CAL. Evw. CODE § 780 (West 1966). See generally McCoRMICK,
supra note 11, at 61-81; 3A WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 874-918 (Chadbourn rev. 1970);
B. WITKN, CALIFORNIA EviDENcE § 1223 et seq. (2d ed. 1966).
62. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 859b (West Supp. 1973).
63. White v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 59 (1963); see also CAL. PEN. CODE § 987
(West Supp. 1973).
64. E.g., California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970) (concerning CAL. Evw. CODE
§ 1235 (West 1966)).
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videotape would prove to be an expedient that would contribute to
the convenience of witnesses and reduce the possibility of delay in
criminal prosecutions. The admissibility of such evidence is always
within the sound discretion of the trial court; determinations of admis-
sibility should be made out of the hearing of the jury. 5
The criminal justice system has not become an entertainment cen-
ter since the advent of motion pictures. Similarly, there will be no
stampede to purchase videotape recorders as their use in courtrooms
becomes less of a novelty. Videotape, like other technological ad-
vances, will become part of the legal process in much the same manner
as it has in other areas such as science and education. Through intelli-
gent supervision of videotape recordings, judges will assist juries as
well as themselves by presenting more accurate and thrutbful informa-
tion on which to base decisions.
Depositions
Depositions have not played a significant role in the disposition of
criminal cases. Perhaps this can be attributed to a conflict between
the time-consuming discovery process associated with civil trials and
the mandate for a speedy trial,66 or the traditional concept that wit-
nesses should be present at the trial of an accused.6 7  Nevertheless,
the use of depositions in criminal proceedings is a much more limited
proposition than it is in civil cases. 68  The purpose here is not to ex-
plore the possible uses of discovery and depositions in the criminal
process; rather, it is merely to advocate the use of videotape deposi-
tions where depositions are otherwise allowed in written form only.69
At the outset, videotape depositions must be distinguished from
prerecorded videotape testimony. The former has as its primary pur-
pose the discovery of evidence. Only secondarily is it used as a sub-
stitute for live testimony. Furthermore, it is procedurally governed
by rules of discovery and not rules of court. On the other hand, the
65. State v. Newman, 4 Wash. App. 588, 593, 484 P.2d 473, 477 (1971).
66. Both federal (FED. R. CruIm. P. 50) and state (CAL. PEN. CODE § 1050 (West
1970)) provisions implement constitutional mandates for a speedy trial. Traditionally,
criminal actions are prepared by reliance on interviews with witnesses. Cf. B. WI-KIN,
CALIFORNIA EVIDENCE § 1056 (2d ed. 1966).
67. See, e.g., FED. R. CRiM. P. 26.
68. Compare FED. R. CRIM. P. 15(a), with FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a).
69. But see Hendricks v. Swenson, 456 F.2d 503, 505 (8th Cir. 1972) where the
court, in a criminal case, stated: "No valid distinction exists between the use of a
deposition taken by video tape and the use of a statement taken by video tape."
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primary use of prerecorded videotape testimony is as evidence at the
trial.
Rule 15(d) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
an example for more archaic state systems whose rules antedate the
advent of videotape.70 The rule provides that a deposition shall be
taken "in the manner provided in civil actions" under the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and that the court may so direct at the re-
quest of the defendant Rule 30(b)(4) of those rules was amended
in 1970 to provide that in civil cases a deposition may be "recorded
by other than stenographic means" upon the motion of either party.
Prior to the amendment, one court had specifically refused to allow
a videotape deposition;71 however, since the amendment's adoption,
courts have allowed both videotape7 2 and audio73 depositions, subject
to certain judicially imposed limitations, of course, to protect the integ-
rity of the recording.7 4  When the case and statutory law are juxta-
posed, it is obvious that there are no legal impediments to the use
of videotape depositions in criminal proceedings .7
70. E.g., CAr.. PEN. CODE §§ 1335-45, 1349-62 (West 1970). In criminal pro-
ceedings, material witnesses may be deposed if because of illness there is reasonable
grounds that they will be unable to attend trial (Id. §§ 1335-45), or if the witness
resides out of state (Id. §§ 1349-62) (defendant only). Depositions may be used at
trial if the witness is otherwise unavailable (Id. §§ 1345, 1362) or by stipulation of
the parties. People v. Risenhoover, 70 Cal. 2d 39, 447 P.2d 925, 73 Cal. Rptr. 533,
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 857 (1968). However, the depositions must be reduced to writ-
ing (CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1343-45, 1357 (West 1970)).
71. U.S. Steel Corp. v. United States, 43 F.R.D. 447 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
72. Carson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 492 (D. Neb. 1971).
73. Marlboro Prods. Corp. v. North American Philips Corp., 55 F.R.D. 487
(S.D.N.Y. 1972); Wescott v. Neeman, 55 F.LD. 257 (D. Neb. 1972); Kallen v. Nexus
Corp., 54 F.R.D. 610 (N.D. IM. 1972).
74. For an in depth analysis of the potential barriers to the use of videotape
in recording depositions in civil trials, see Kornblum, Videotape in Civil Cases, 24 HAs-
TINGs L.J. 9, 14-26 (1972).
75. In Hutchins v. Florida, 286 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1973), a deposition by videotape
was taken of a prosecution witness in a felony drug case. It was stipulated by both
the defendant and the prosecution that the witness would be legitimately unavailable
for the trail. Defendant and his counsel were present at the deposition with opportun-
ity to cross-examine. Florida statutory law provided for the recording of testimony
"by mechanical means" but contemplated the transcription of such testimony and the
presentation of that transcript at trial. The prosecution did not transcribe the video-
taped deposition but rather showed the videotape itself at the trial. Claiming a lack
of precedent for such a presentation and a violation of the defendant's right to con-
front the witness at trial, the defendant objected to the videotape showing. In ruling
that the admissibility of the videotaped testimony was not prejudicial error, the Florida
court stated: "If the previously taken and preserved testimony of the witness, unable
to be present was admissible at the trial, it has not been shown how its submission
by video tape, as distinguished from a written transcription of the questions and an-
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Presentation of Testimony by Videotape
The use of videotape as an accurate, efficient and economical
means of presenting evidence is not limited to tapes of ex parte state-
ments or tapes of physical evidence, scenes, or events. This discussion
began with reference to a witness whose likeness, voice and observa-
tions were presented at trial before a jury some time after the witness
had died. 76  As in that case, videotape offers the opportunity to pre-
sent testimony in a manner legally indistinguishable from that in which
it has been presented for centuries. The factual distinction, and the
basis for the advantages of presenting testimony in this manner, is that
the witness need not be physically present. The constitutionality of
this procedure is established in the following sections through an an-
alysis of the constitutional considerations it raises.
The Confrontation Clause
The Sixth Amendment's confrontation clause states: "In all crim-
inal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him . . . . ,,77 An argument can
be made that this clause, applicable to the states through the Four-
teenth Amendment, 78 militates against an "electronic" confrontation.
Does the defendant confront a witness whose testimony has been pre-
recorded and later shown to the jury? The answer to the question
would seem obvious if it were not for the fact that there has been
much debate and little resolution on the more basic question of pre-
cisely what does the confrontation clause require?
By offering two different constructions of the word "witnesses,"
one can arrive at two diametrically opposed constructions of the
clause. 79  If "witnesses" means exclusively those who appear in court
to testify, then a defendant has a right to be confronted by them, and
by no one else. Blithe application of the maxim of judicial construc-
tion, expressio unius est exclusio alterius, that is, the statement of the
one is to the exclusion of all others, would lead to the conclusion that
while a defendant can demand the appearance of witnesses, he can
do nothing about affiants or deponents. There is case authority, how-
swers, resulted in harmful error. Where not otherwise prejudicial, the use of sound
moving pictures, as a scientific advance in presentation of evidentiary matter at trials,
has generally been viewed with approval." Id. at 246.
76. See text accompanying note I supra.
77. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI.
78. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403-06 (1965).
79. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 175 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring).
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ever, to the effect that trial by affidavit is exactly the evil which the
confrontation clause was drafted to prevent.80 On the other hand,
"witnesses" can be read to include all who offer evidence. In that case,
admission of a dying declaration would be prohibited by the con-
frontation clause, for the defendant can make no fruitful demand that
he be confronted by the declarant. Yet such declarations have been
said not to violate the constitutional requirement.
81
No court has adopted either construction of the confrontation
clause outlined above. Unfortunately, that rejection is as far as the
unanimity goes. Unable to find a suitable definition of the clause
which offers precision, the courts and writers are given to discussions
of the "main thrust" or "underlying rationale"; still, there appears to
be no unanimity. At least five positions have been put forward to
explain the content of the right to be confronted by one's accusers.
There is much overlap, and no one position alone can explain the re-
sults of the cases.
Recent decisions suggest that the right to cross-examine witnesses
is at the heart of the right to be confronted.82  Much is made by pro-
ponents of this view of the truth-finding capabilities of an aggressive
counsel matched with a halting witness. Indeed, long before the Sixth
Amendment was held to apply to the states, the United States Supreme
Court indicated that the right to examine witnesses was a Fourteenth
Amendment right included in due process.8 3  Yet the confrontation
clause is clearly not congruent with the right to cross-examine. Dying
declarations are apparently not violative of the clause,8 4 and there is
clearly no opportunity for cross-examination. On -the other hand, even
though there may have been cross-examination of a witness at a previous
hearing, the clause prohibits a reading of that testimony into the record
absent a showing that the state has made all due efforts to procure the
witness's attendance and the witness remains unavailable.8 5
Many have sought to establish a definitional relationship between
hearsay and the confrontation clause. The similarity of concerns
which underlie both the evidentiary exclusionary rule of hearsay and
80. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 157-58 (1970); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
81. Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 61 (1899); see Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895).
82. See Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Douglas v. Alabama, 380
U.S. 415 (1965); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
83. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1947).
84. See cases cited note 81 supra.
85. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968)_
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the constitutional right to be confronted are obvious. In hearsay testi-
mony, a statement made other than by a witness while testifying is
offered to the trier of fact to prove the truth of the matter stated.
Since that statement by definition is not subject to contemporaneous
cross-examination, the question arises whether a defendant has a con-
stitutionally protected right to be confronted by a hearsay declarant,
and, absent such confrontation, whether the declaration is constitution-
ally inadmissible. Among the courts and writers who have found a
close relationship between confrontation and hearsay, some have sug-
gested that the relevant measure of the constitutional provision is the
extent of the hearsay rule at the time the Sixth Amendment was
adopted,8 6 while others argue that the Sixth Amendment implicitly em-
braced the then existing rule together with whatever changes were
wrought through judicial evolution.87
The problems with either approach are manifold. If we are to
accept the first proposition, that the confrontation clause merely wrote
into the Constitution the then-existing hearsay rule, we must wonder
why the framers felt drawn to such circumspection. Rather than enter
into an historical analysis of the hearsay rule,8" the courts have tended
to ignore this construction of the clause. 9 The second proposition,
that the clause embraced the hearsay rule as it had developed and
was to develop, is equally questionable and equally without support.
That a fluid rule of evidence would gain equal stature with other por-
tions of the Bill of Rights is, at best, dubious. The cases indicate
no absolute congruence with the hearsay rule, either as it existed then
or exists today. Certain matters are held to offend the clause even
when they come within an exception to the hearsay rule.
Another approach to an explanation of the clause has been that
reliable testimony will not offend the protected right.9  This notion
appears to be an offshoot of the hearsay approach, as most exceptions
to that rule appear to be based on presumptive reliability. A man
86. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1895).
87. 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 130-31 (3d ed. 1940).
88. There is apparently much doubt as to the extent of the hearsay rule and its
exceptions at the time the Sixth Amendment was adopted. Compare F. HELLER, THE
SiXT AMENDMENT 105 (1951), with 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1397, at 130 (3rd
ed. 1940).
89. Thus numerous cases have found constitutional inadmissibility under the
Sixth Amendment where the evidence was arguably admissible under a hearsay excep-
tion. See, e.g., Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968); Barber v. Page, 390
U.S. 719 (1968); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
90. See Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243-44 (1895); cf. 75 YALE LJ.
1434 (1966).
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would not die with a lie on his lips, and therefore his dying declarations
are admissible.91  Similarly, an excited utterance is admissible, 92 as
are declarations against interest since no man would make a declara-
tion against his penal interests that was false. 3  This idea that testi-
mony of presumptive reliability will pass constitutional muster is un-
tenable, for the language of the clause itself admits of no such con-
struction and provides no such blanket exception to the literal right
of confrontation. Accordingly, no case has been found which rests
its holding of Sixth Amendment conformity upon the reliability of ten-
dered evidence. If reliability is any sort of constitutional yardstick,
it would seem better housed in the due process clause, with its ap-
parently broader scope.94
Justice Harlan, with characteristic scholarship, has presented what
is perhaps the most satisfactory measure for explaining past cases and
resolving new challenges. He suggested that the clause "reaches no
farther than to require the prosecution to produce any available witness
whose declarations it seeks to use at a criminal trial."9  While the
Sixth Amendment, as construed in recent decisions, appears to go fur-
ther, it at least goes this far. This underlying idea of availability ex-
plains why the former testimony of a witness is not sufficient when
that witness is himself available,96 and why it is constitutionally suf-
ficient when the witness is deceased 97 even though the defendant's
right to cross-examination is lacking in both situations.98 If the witness
is available, then the prosecution has an affirmative duty to produce
him.19 Although the words he will utter may be the same as those
which might have been read into the transcript, the jury will have an
opportunity to observe him.
We come now to the use of videotape, and to the question of
whether its use may violate the accused's right to confront his wit-
nesses. Because the right may be waived, the Sixth Amendment pre-
sents no barriers to the defendant who desires to offer testimony on
91. MCCORMICK, supra note 11, at 680-81.
92. Id. at 704-09.
93. Id. at 673-75.
94. 75 YALE LJ. 1434, 1438 (1966).
95. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 174 (1970) (concurring opinion) (empha-
sis in original).
96. Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968).
97. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
98. Id. at 243.
99. See Barber v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968). Thus, in a sense, the confronta-
tion clause can be viewed as a standard for prosecutorial behavior. See 75 YALE LJ.
1434, 1439 (1966).
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his behalf to the jury by videotape. Where the prosecution desires
to offer testimony in this manner, the defendant might object, arguing
that he is entitled to have the witness appear before the jury and be
cross-examined before them.' 0 A simple description of the possible
mechanics of pre-taping testimony can meet this objection.
An expert witness may find it impossible to attend trial at a cer-
tain time. A witness for the prosecution may be threatened, and his
safety may depend upon a lack of knowledge of his whereabouts. Or,
more unlikely but obviously possible, a witness may be dying. In all
these instances, important needs could be met by videotaping the testi-
mony of such witnesses. 10 The defendant, his counsel, the prosecu-
100. Hutchins v. Florida, 286 So. 2d 244, 246 (Fla. 1973) where the defendant
in a felony drug case made this contention.
101. In the recent case of United States v. Talbott, 58 F.R.D. 212 (N.D. Ohio
1973), the defendant moved to videotape the testimony of a psychologist. The psy-
chologist refused to testify in person at the trial for the $300.00 maximum compensa-
tion that a federal district court judge is authorized to allow for the payment of experts
in an indigent criminal case. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(3) (1970). However, the
psychologist would have consented to being videotaped for $300.00. In denying the
defendant's motion, the court, per Judge Lambros, stated: "This motion presents a
question of first impression for the Court. On one hand, the videotaping of experts
would result in a substantial savings to the Government in light of the rising fees for
psychologists and psychiatrists time. On the other hand, Rule 15(e) of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure appears to authorize the admission of such videotaping
only when the witness would not be available to testify. Technically, the expert in
this case could be subpoenaed to testify. Furthermore, his compensation in excess of
the amount which may be authorized by this Court will be paid, if approved by the
Chief Judge of this Circuit.
"The first alternative, that of subpoenaing the witness, is unacceptable to the
Court. If subpoenaed, the expert witness might well be hostile ...
"The second alternative, that of approval of an excess amount by the Chief Judge,
is still available to the defendant. Given this Circuit's statements in Tate [United
States v. Tate, 419 F.2d 131 (6th Cir. 1969)], the Court feels that payment in excess
of $300.00 will be approved if warranted.
"The Court, therefore, denies defendant's motion and directs defendant to present
experts' testimony orally at trial in open court." United States v. Talbott, 58 F.R.D.
212, 213 (N.D. Ohio 1973).
In a letter to the authors on April 30, 1973, Judge Lambros expressed the follow-
ing sentiments: "[Sipeaking generally, I favor a re-examination of Rules 15(e)
and 26 which require 'live' testimony of all available witnesses. As a practical matter,
the Rules preclude the use by defendants of videotaped expert testimony. This can
and does impose a hardship on indigent defendants who are limited, without approval
of the Chief Judge of the Circuit, to $300 per expert. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(3). It
is sometimes the case that experts will provide videotaped testimony for that fee but
will not provide in-court testimony for the same amount.
"I do not wish, however, at this time, to advocate an abolition of Rule 26
without also suggesting an alternative provision which would safeguard the rights of
cross-examination and confrontation and without further investigation into the effects of
videotape on the witness and jury."
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tion and the judge, if his presence is required, could meet at nearly
any location they choose, and videotape the proceedings. The content
of the testimony, rules of evidence and the cross-examination of the
witness would be in no way affected. The tape would then be played
at the trial, at which time the jury could observe the witness's demeanor
at least as meticulously as if he were physically in their presence.
Questions of hearsay do not arise, for the tape is not a transcription
of an out-of-court declaration. The "trial" includes both the taping
session and the presentation of the tape to the jury. The "court" in-
cludes both the room in which the jury observes the testimony and
the room in which the testimony was taped. For these same reasons,
questions of availability do not arise. The witness is available, and
he is testifying before the jury. Cross-examination, the most central
feature of the confrontation clause, at least according to the recent
cases, takes place, albeit on tape, before the jury. Its effectiveness
as a truth-discovering device is not affected at all.1
0 3
The Sixth Amendment became part of the Constitution in 1789;
it therefore is not surprising that the words of the Sixth Amendment
do not proscribe the use of videotape, so its omission is not significant.
It is a strong argument, however, that in none of the manifold attempts
to describe the content of the right to be confronted is there any theme
or consideration which militates against the use of taped testimony.
Indeed, the concerns expressed in all approaches are met and served
by this technological advance.
Though the majority in California v. Green'04 dealt in terms ap-
parently simplistic enough to prompt Harlan's historical treatise in a
separate concurrence, 10 5 they managed to state three of the most salu-
tory effects of the confrontation clause:
Confrontation: (1) insures that the witness will give his state-
ments under oath-thus impressing him with the seriousness of the
matter and guarding against the lie by the possibility of a penalty
for perjury; (2) forces the witness to submit to cross-examination,
the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of the
truth"; (3) permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate
to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement,
thus aiding the jury in assessing his credibility. 10 6
Viewing these three factors, and all factors mentioned to this point,
it is fruitless to argue that the confrontation clause in any way inveighs
103. See text cited in note 75 supra for a description of the recent case of Hutch-
ins v. Florida, 286 So. 2d 244 (Fla. 1973) involving this very situation.
104. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
105. Id. at 172.
106. id. at 158.
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against the use of videotaped testimony. Rather, this technological
tool offers a means of insuring that a jury can view testimony which
they otherwise might have been unable to view. It further offers a
witness the opportunity to be "available" through videotape when he
might otherwise be unavailable, or when his physical appearance
would work hardship on himself or the parties. Finally, the jury is
guaranteed a clear and unobstructed view of testimony, and the con-
frontation clause has never been held to demand more.
Public Trial
Aside from guaranteeing a defendant the right to be confronted
by the witnesses against him, the Sixth Amendment requires that in
all criminal proceedings, there must be a public trial.1" 7 This concept
is so firmly embedded in our jurisprudence that few modem cases
arise in assertion of the right. Yet is it conceivable that a defendant,
faced with incriminating testimony presented on videotape to a jury,
could complain that his right to a public trial would be infringed. This
is, however, an objection of no vitality.
The right to a public trial is as easily understood as the result
of its denial. The opposite of a public trial is a secret trial, a proceed-
ing analogous to the Spanish Inquisition, to the English Court of the
Star Chamber or to the French lettre de cachet.1 8 The right to a
public trial is afforded as a check upon the tribunal and as insurance
that excesses shrouded in secrecy will not occur. 1 9 Because of the
overriding importance of public trials, the cases allowing exclusion to
any degree are based upon compelling interests. Thus, the press may
be limited during trial to protect the defendant from unfair pub-
licity; 110 some spectators may be removed to avoid harassment or in-
timidation of a witness;"' or an airline hijacker "profile" may be intro-
duced in camera to preserve its value."'
Our question, however, is not whether videotaped testimony will,
in a given case, come within an exception to the nearly absolute right
107. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
108. In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 269 (1947).
109. Id. at 270. See 1 J. BENTHAm, RATIONALE OF JuiciAL EVIDENCE 524
(1827).
110. Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532
(1965).
111. United States ex rel. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 957 (1970); United States ex rel. Orlando v. Fay, 350 F.2d 967, 970
(2d Cir. 1965), cert. denied sub nom. Orlando v. Follette, 384 U.S. 1008 (1966).
112. United States v. Lopez, 328 F. Supp. 1077 (E.D.N.Y. 1971).
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to a public trial. Indeed, where the purpose of the taped procedure
is to protect the witness from physical harm, there seems little doubt
that its use would be permitted.113 The question is whether the use
of videotaped testimony impinges at all upon the right to a public trial.
Clearly, it does not.
The crux of the right is an avoidance of secret proceedings, an
assurance that those who conduct criminal proceedings do so in the
light of day." 4  If testimony is taped, even in surroundings of the
strongest security, and later played in open court before a jury, the
press and spectators, the presentation is no less public than if the wit-
ness were in physical attendance. As we suggested earlier, the "trial"
is the taping session and the presentation of the tape. When the testi-
mony in question is presented in open court, when the witness's de-
meanor is observable by all, then the right to a public trial is un-
touched.
Ethical Considerations
We have shown to this point that the use of videotape in criminal
proceedings is clearly not constitutionally proscribed. A lesser but not
insignificant potential barrier to the use of videotape to record trials
may arise in the ethical prohibitions against photography in the court-
room. Canon 35 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:
The taking of photographs in the courtroom, during sessions of
the court or recesses between sessions, and the broadcasting or tel-
evising of court proceedings, are calculated to detract from the
essential dignity of the proceedings, distract the witness in giving
his testimony, degrade the court, and create misconceptions with
respect thereto in the mind of the public and should not be per-
mitted.115
The genesis of this proscription is not difficult to understand. In early
1935, Bruno Hauptmann was tried for the kidnapping of Charles Lind-
bergh's child. After a spate of pretrial publicity which today doubtless
would be grounds for reversal,:" 6 the media accompanied the defend-
and television in a courtroom and if it is to be given binding force,
total. Flashbulbs, cameras, wires and members of the press gave the
trial the appearance of a Hollywood premiere. Stung by the resulting
criticism of the Hauptmann experience, the American Bar Association
adopted Canon 35 in 1937.7
113. See cases cited note 111 supra.
114. See notes 108-109 and accompanying text supra.
115. ABA CANONS o JuDciL ETmics No. 35.
116. See Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).
117. Doubles, A Camera in the Courtroom, 22 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1, 2 (1965).
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If Canon 35 represents an absolute prohibition of photography
and television in a courtroom and if it is to be given binding force,
then the use of videotape to record judicial proceedings is impossible.
Yet we can conclude that the prohibition in Canon 35 is not absolute,
and that no court is bound by a literal interpretation of the language.
First, as indicated by the circumstances attending its adoption, Canon
35 was concerned with guaranteeing a litigant a fair trial, unfettered by
boisterous attempts to present a blow-by-blow description to a curious
public. What must be preserved is the dignity of the proceedings, the
freedom from distraction of the witnesses, and the avoidance of public
misconception.
While the language of Canon 35 was clear in its broad prohibi-
tion, it lacked binding force upon the courts." 8  Since dignity, de-
corum and fairness were the considerations leading to the canon, it
was the presence or absence of those factors rather than the strict in-
terpretation of Canon 35 which was at issue upon appeal in a case
where the trial judge had allowed televising of part of the proceed-
ings." 9  Clearly, then, a transgression of the literal boundaries of the
canon was not grounds for reversal. The proposals we make here
for the use of videotape in the courtoom are limited only by the impact
such use would have upon an essentially fair trial.
Regardless of the import of Canon 35, the American Bar Associa-
tion has recognized technological advancements and the need for
greater judicial efficiency in its more recent statement on the propriety
of audiovisual media in judicial proceedings. 120 Canon 35 was di-
rected to allaying sensationalism; the heated arguments which sur-
rounded it concerned "fair trial versus free press.'' Most of the
opponents of the rule argued for the public's right to be made aware
of proceedings in its courtrooms 122 and for First Amendment protec-
tion for the news media.' 23 Its proponents needed to point only to the
excesses of the media in certain trials, and to raise the argument that
a trial, and most particularly a criminal trial, was so important to the
See generally Robbins, The Hauptman Trial in the Light of English Criminal Proce-
dure, 21 A.B.A.J. 301 (1935).
118. State v. Langley, 214 Ore. 445, 323 P.2d 301 (1958).
119. Lyles v. State, 330 P.2d 734 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1958).
120. See text accompanying note 125 infra.
121. See In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 126 A.2d 679 (1956).
122. iSee id. at 277-78, 126 A.2d at 692 (Musmanno, J., dissenting); Lyles v. State,
330 P.2d 734, 742-43 (Okla. Crim. Ct. App. 1958).
123. E.g., Daly, Radio and Television News and Canon 35, 6 NEB. S.B.J. 121
(1957).
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rights of the accused that any desire to educate the public was vastly
overbalanced.
1 24
While this debate still has vitality, it is one into which we need
not enter here. We are concerned with the use of videotape not to
show the interested public what takes place, but rather to present to
the jury testimony of witnesses who are unavailable for live appearance
in the courtroom or who would be seriously inconvenienced by such
appearance; to present confessions which carry with them evidence
as to their voluntariness; to present ex parte statements which will of-
fer greater clarity than a dry printed transcript; to prerecord testimony
and present it in continuous sequence to the jury, avoiding long re-
cesses, arguments, and attendant jury boredom; and to record the en-
tire proceeding in court in order to acquire a record totally devoid
of transcriptive error for use in preparation of appeal, on appeal, and
possibly on retrial. These are purposes consonant with sound judicial
administration and, significantly, with the newly adopted Canon 3A(7)
of the Code of Judicial Ethics promulgated by the American Bar As-
sociation:
A judge should prohibit broadcastings, televising, recording, or
taking photographs in the courtroom and areas adjacent thereto
during sessions of court or recesses between sessions, except that
a judge may authorize: (a) the use of electronic or photographic
means for the presentation of evidence, for the perpetuation of
a record, or for other purposes of judicial administration .... 125
The prohibition of cameras or other electronic recording devices
in the courtroom is aimed strictly at preventing a sensational, vaudevil-
lian atmosphere which would deprive a defendant of a fair trial. That
the rigidity of this prohibition is still open to debate does not concern
us here. We propose the wider use of video technology in criminal
proceedings for its value in the accurate presentation and preservation
of evidence and for furthering the interests of judicial administration.
There are no ethical considerations which militate against these pur-
poses.1 28
124. See Griswold, The Standards of the Legal Profession: Canon 35 Should Not
Be Surrendered, 48 A.B.A.J. 616 (1962).
125. 58 A.B.A.J. 1207, 1208 (1972).
126. The Conference of California Judges Ethics Committee opined that it would
be ethically proper to videotape an entire misdemeanor trial, with the consent of the
parties, outside the presence of the jury, and later to present the trial on tape to the
jury:
"Nothing in the present California Canons of Judicial Ethics prevents the video-
taping of courtroom proceedings by unobtrusive cameras solely for judicial administra-
tive purposes and not for broadcast when to guarantee the condition that there be no
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Conclusion
We have mentioned throughout this article various ways in which
videotape technology might be used in the criminal process. Lest the
reader by overwhelmed by visions of cameras and cables strewn ran-
domly across the body of our jurisprudence, a recapitulation of those
uses should be offered.
1. Once the accusatory stage has been reached by a potential
criminal defendant, any confession or statement which he offers, to-
gether with his Miranda warnings, should be taped. The product
would be more meaningful to the trier of fact than would be a written
transcript, and would further aid the preliminary determination of vol-
untariness.
2. Lineups, showups, views of scenes or views of the crime itself
can be preserved on tape and presented at trial, removing the element
of testimonial mistake or inconsistency.
3. Though the use of depositions in criminal practice is limited,
where depositions are taken, they should be videotaped. This would
allow review of a deponent's demeanor and his testimony by the attor-
ney, would eliminate transcriptive errors and, if the deposition is used
at trial, would be preferable to a written transcript.
4. Perfunctory evidence at preliminary hearings, such as chain
of custody evidence, corpus evidence (for example, testimony of a bur-
glary victim that his house was entered without permission and that cer-
tain goods were taken) or other testimony which normally goes unchal-
lenged, could be recorded, upon motion, at the convenience of the
parties and witnesses and made a part of the record. This would be
particularly advantageous in eliminating police man hours spent on a
broadcast the judge have full control of all of the film and the party doing the taping
guarantee that the tape will not be used in any manner for commercial or broadcast
purposes.
"In rendering this opinion the Committee considered Canon 30 ....
"The Commitee also considered the Proposed Final Draft of the American Bar
Association Code of Judicial Ethics, Canon 3 A (7) ....
"Consideration was given to the fact that in the past the obtrusiveness of tele-
vision cameras has been a major objection, that carrying the broadcast live was an ob-
jection and third that public broadcast was a major objection.
"The Committee carefully considered the first paragraph of Canon 30 and felt that
the experimental purpose requested by the judge and bearing in mind the fact that new
methods may be required in order to meet new times felt that there was no improper
interference with judicial proceedings when the video-taping was accomplished by unob-
trusive cameras, when the taping was not for broadcast but was solely for judicial ad-
ministrative purposes and when the judge had full control of the manner of the taping
and of the tape produced."
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witness stand when no controversy exists as to a policeman's testimony.
5. Actual testimony, given in the presence of the defendant,
counsel, and judge, with full direct and cross-examination and in full
conformity with procedural rules, could be taped out of the presence
of the jury. It then could be presented in proper sequence before
the jury and in a setting open to the public. Such a procedure would
protect an endangered witness, eliminate the inconvenience to an ex-
pert witness, and lower costs to the party presenting the expert testi-
mony. Finally, the testimony of a witness whose future availability
is in doubt would be preserved.
6. A final proposed use of videotape is the recordation of the
entire trial. This can be done unobtrusively and without running afoul
of any ethical considerations. The advantages are a transcript free
of error and an immediate transcript for use in preparation of an ap-
peal. Furthermore, part or all of the tape, excluding only those por-
tions which contain legal error, could be used upon retrial.
To embrace technological change and avail oneself of its benefits
without proper consideration of possible disadvantages is to follow a
course which has too often led to an unnecessarily negative reaction.
While we are not proposing here that juries do nothing but observe
a television screen, we are suggesting that they receive much of their
information through this medium. Is anything lost? Jerome Frank
suggested that very few facts floated through a trial; instead, witnesses
offered subjective views from memory, and jurors received subjective
impressions in listening so that the verdict represented an opinion-
the jury's-of an opinion-the witness's. 127 He felt that a trial could
best be explained as a gestalt, that is, the whole being greater than
the sum of its part and not explicable through examination of any par-
ticular component.128  Input, Frank suggested, was from so many
sources that mathematical reformulation of the process was impos-
sible.' 29  By narrowing the jury's focus to -testimony coming through
a video monitor, we may be limiting input which has heretofore con-
tributed to the synergistic result. We may also be proposing a medium
which itself affects the psychological impact of the messages it carries.
By raising these considerations, we do not abandon our advocacy.
We merely urge that the legal profession closely observe all results
of this innovation. Contemporaneous with the expanding use of vid-
127. J. FNi, CouRTs ON TRuAL 17-20 (1949).
128. Id. at 165-85.
129. Id. at 190.
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eotape in legal proceedings should be research, specifically conducted
for the bar, which evaluates the effects, both objective and subjective,
of videotape in the courtroom. If Frank's analysis is correct, then by
using videotape and video monitors, we may be distilling the essential
factors and removing irrelevant input, thereby improving the fact-
finding process. Again, this is worthy of research.
Our concern here is that the many benefits available through
video technology not be lost due to resistance based on nebulous fears.
The criminal law is not frozen. In California v. Green, Chief Justice
Burger concurred separately
only to emphasize the importance of allowing the States to exper-
iment and innovate, especially in the area of criminal justice. If
new standards and procedures are tried in one State their success
or failure will be a guide to others and to the Congress.
130
We are proposing experimentation not for its own sake, but to achieve
the benefits which each proposal outlined above can offer. Because
of a number of sensational trials, cameras in the courtroom have re-
ceived a bad name, just as, over centuries of practice, traditional court-
room justice has received a good name. Video technology, we be-
lieve, offers benefits without jeopardy to the criminal process. Writ-
ing for the Yale Law Journal in 1908, Justice H. B. Brown used words
which now serve as an interesting metaphor:
The automobile has much to contend against in its offensive char-
acteristics, and above all, in the arrogant disregard of the rights
of others with which it is often driven; but new inventions may
obviate some of these difficulties, and a few sharp lessons from
the courts may inculcate more respect for the rights of others.
Whatever the outcome may be, every true admirer of the horse
will pray that it may not be the extinction or dethronement of
the noblest of all domestic animals.'
3 '
Far from signaling the "extinction or dethronement" of traditional
courtroom justice, videotape helps to preserve it. As discussed in this
article, the potential of videotape in criminal proceedings is too great
to ignore. It is hoped that this article will help encourage the use
of videotape so that its potential will be realized.
130. 399 U.S. 149, 171 (1970).
131. Brown, The Status of the Automobile, 17 YALE L.J. 223, 231 (1908).
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